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This paper summarizes the main findings in a series of coordinated studies conducted to 
assess the impact of social security programs on the distribution of lifetime labor income in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. The country-case studies find varying 
degrees of redistribution, with PAYG-DB and mixed programs redistributing more than 
individual savings accounts programs. Notwithstanding, it is the Chilean individual savings 
accounts program, combined with the recently reformed solidarity pillar, the one that 
contributes more to reducing inequality in this group of countries.  
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Resumen 
Este documento resume los principales resultados en una serie de estudios coordinados que 
evalúan el impacto de los programas de seguridad social en la distribución del ingreso 
laboral a lo largo de la vida en Argentina, Brasil, Chile, México y Uruguay. Los estudios a 
nivel país encuentran diferentes grados de redistribución, en particular, los programas 
PAYG-BD y mixtos redistribuyen más que los programas con cuentas de ahorro. A pesar 
de ello, es el programa chileno de cuentas de ahorro combinado con el pilar solidario 
recientemente reformado el que contribuye más a reducir la desigualdad dentro de este 
grupo de países.  
Palabras Clave: Redistribución, Seguridad Social. 
JEL Code: H55, J14, J26 
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1  Introduction 
 
The present paper summarizes the main findings of five country-case studies conducted to 
analyze the impact of unemployment insurance and pension programs on the distribution 
of lifetime income in Latin America (Fajnzylber 2011, Forteza and Mussio 2011, Moncarz 
2011 and Zylberstajn 2011). Based on longitudinal data, we estimate econometric models 
of contributions to social security and labor income and run Monte Carlo simulations of 
expected life time labor income and net transfers to social security. Using these estimations 
we then compute indicators of distribution and redistribution of income. We find that some 
programs perform much redistribution, but the programs that redistribute more are not 
necessarily the ones that make the greater contribution to reducing inequality.  
The pension programs covered in our project range from the fully PAYG-DB Argentinean 
and Brazilian to the individual accounts DC Chilean and Mexican programs, and also 
include the Uruguayan mixed program. Unemployment insurance is based on savings 
accounts and common pool schemes in Brazil and Chile and on common pool PAYG 
financing in Argentina and Uruguay. Hence, our sample allows for a comparison of the 
redistributive impact of different social security designs.  
Previous studies show that densities of contribution are low and very heterogeneous in 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (Forteza et al 2009). We do not have similar longitudinal 
studies for Brazil and Mexico, but social security coverage of the labor force in these two 
countries suggests that contribution densities cannot be much higher in Brazil and Mexico 
than in the other three countries. Therefore, we are assessing social security redistribution 
in the presence of low density and highly fragmented histories of contributions, 
considering five social security programs with substantial differences. 
In the next section we briefly describe the programs to be analyzed. In section three we 
present the conceptual framework and discuss antecedents in the literature. We describe 
the data and methods in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 contains the results and section 7 
concludes with some final remarks.  
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2  The old-age pension and unemployment insurance programs 
 
In 1981, Chile pioneered a series of pension programs reforms that introduced mandatory 
individual savings accounts, phasing out the traditional PAYG-DB scheme.  In the 
nineties, Mexico reformed its pension program along the same lines as Chile. Also in the 
mid nineties, Argentina and Uruguay introduced mandatory individual savings accounts, 
but without completely phasing out the PAYG-DB pillar. The result was a two pillar (or 
two tiers) mixed program. Brazil did a series of parametric reforms without introducing 
savings accounts in its pension program. 
New reforms took place in the 2000s. The most radical of the new wave of reforms was the 
Argentinean abolition of the individual savings accounts. The current scheme is a partially 
funded DB program. Funds accumulated in the individual accounts were allocated to a 
collective pension fund. In 2008, Chile strengthened the redistributive component of its 
pension system, replacing the minimum pension and old-age assistance programs with a 
basic solidarity pension and a pension supplement. Also in 2008, Uruguay adjusted its 
program, loosening pension eligibility conditions.  
We summarize in Table 1 the main parameters of these pension programs as they are 
today. These are the parameters used for the simulations in this study. 
In addition, there is considerable variation in the design and scope of unemployment 
insurance programs in the set of countries included in this study. Argentina and Uruguay 
have traditional common pool PAYG programs, Brazil has parallel common pool and 
individual accounts programs, Chile has an integrated program that combines individual 
accounts with social insurance and Mexico does not have an explicit unemployment 
insurance program (Velásquez 2010). 
 
The Argentinean program was enacted in 1992. It is financed out of employer 
contributions of 1.5% of wages on a PAYG common-pool basis and benefits are earnings 
related.
3 The first Brazilian unemployment program was founded in 1967 and consists of a 
compulsory contribution that employers have to deposit in an individual account, called 
                                                            
3 There is also a small unemployment insurance savings accounts program in Argentina for construction 
workers. 3 
 
FGTS (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servico). A second program was enacted in 1986, 
incorporated in the Constitution in 1988 and implemented and expanded during the 
nineties. This program has common pool financing and earnings-related benefits (Barreto 
de Oliveira and Beltrão 2002). Chile introduced a new unemployment insurance scheme in 
2002. This program combines self and social insurance: workers and employers contribute 
to individual savings accounts and the government and employers contribute to a common 
pool called the “solidarity fund”. Mexico does not have an unemployment insurance 
program, save for the advanced age unemployment insurance scheme (seguro de cesantía 
en edad avanzada) that covers individuals aged 60 and above (Ochoa 2005). With 
antecedents dating to the early twentieth century, the current Uruguayan unemployment 
insurance program was enacted in 1981 and expanded in 2001 (Amarante and Bucheli 
2008). It is a traditional common pool earnings related program.  
3  Conceptual framework 
 
We assess redistribution within social insurance programs computing lifetime 
contributions and benefits. Our focus is on mostly contributory programs, but some non-
contributory components cannot and should not be separated from the contributory ones. 
The Chilean solidarity supplement is an example of a well integrated non contributory 
component in a mostly contributory program. The financing that governments often 
provide in PAYG programs is also a “non contributory” component of social security. In 
some cases, this financing is incorporated in the design of the programs (for example, some 
points of the value added tax are earmarked for social security in Uruguay), but in most 
cases governments just pay what is needed to keep social security programs working.    
Social Security programs are usually designed to redistribute income from the better to the 
worse off. Most benefit formulas include explicit redistributive components, such as 
minimum pensions and supplements to small pensions. Even individual accounts DC 
programs, which are based on the principle of actuarial neutrality, tend to incorporate non-
actuarial redistributive ingredients. 
But social security programs also redistribute income through less explicit mechanisms. 
First, high mortality rates may reduce the returns low income workers get for their 4 
 
contributions in pension programs when unified mortality tables are used (Garrett, 1995; 
Duggan et al. 1995; Beach and Davis 1998; Brown et al. 2009).
4  
Second, government transfers that contribute to finance social security in many countries 
favor the population that is covered by the programs, which in developing countries tends 
to be the better off (Rofman et al. 2008). But also these same groups are the ones that pay 
more taxes, so the net effect is not clear (Forteza and Rossi, 2009). Ideally, we should trace 
the origin of the funds governments spend financing social security and include those taxes 
in the individuals’ cash flows.   
Third, low densities of contribution may leave many workers ineligible for benefits. Low 
income workers have been shown to have particularly low densities of contribution 
(Forteza et al. 2009; Berstein et al. 2006). In this research project, we focused on this last 
channel, i.e. the redistribution stemming from the fact that low income workers tend to 
have systematically shorter contribution histories. We will not assess the impact of 
different mortality rates and different coverage on implicit redistribution. 
Social Security redistribution is often assessed on an annual basis, analyzing taxes paid and 
benefits received by different groups of contributors. This type of analysis tends to show 
large transfers among groups which depend mostly on the ratio of beneficiaries to earners 
within each group. But most individuals transit from earning income and paying 
contributions to receiving pension benefits along their lifecycle. Therefore, redistribution 
performed through social security can be better assessed adopting a lifetime perspective 
(Liebman, 2001).  
We run micro-simulations of lifetime income and social security contributions and benefits 
to assess redistribution, focusing on intra-generational redistribution: one cohort that lives 
with the current pension rules. It is worth noticing though that social security performs 
inter- as well as intra-generational redistribution and there is considerable evidence that 
inter-generational redistribution has been substantial, with early generations usually 
benefiting with high returns to contributions (Liebman 2001, Morató and Musto, 2010). 
                                                            
4 There is however contradicting evidence on the impact of differential mortality rates on social security 
progressiveness. Brown et al. (2009), for example, report very small effects on the measured progressivity of 
the US Social Security program of incorporating differential mortality rates by race and education.   5 
 
The  indicator used in this study to quantify transfers is the social security wealth, which is 
the net present value of the expected lifetime flows of contributions and benefits (Gruber 
and Wise, 1999, 2004; Coile and Gruber, 2001; Liebman, 2001, Brown et al. 2009). Also, 
we assess the progressivity of the system by comparing the distribution of the expected 
pre- and post-social security lifetime income. Pre-social security lifetime income is the 
present value of income before contributions to social security and without benefits from 
social security. Post-social security income is the present value of lifetime income net of 
contributions to social security and including benefits from social security. The comparison 
is performed based on  standard Lorenz and concentration curves, Gini indexes and an 
index of net redistributive effect. 
We consider the individual as the unit of analysis, but it should be noticed that 
redistribution in the social security system may look very different at the family level. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) show that, when analyzed at the individual level, the U.S. 
social security looks very redistributive, favoring low income workers, but it looks much 
less so at the family level (see also Lambert 1993, p 14). In the words of Brown et al. 
(2009): “…much of the apparent redistribution from Social Security occurs within, rather 
than between, households.” 
Ideally, the assessment of the redistributive impact of social security programs should be 
based on the comparison of income distribution with and without social security.
5 This is 
not the same as comparing pre- and post-social security income (i.e. income minus 
contributions plus benefits), because social security is likely to induce changes in work 
hours, savings, wages and interest rates. In this line, Huggett and Ventura (2000) simulate 
a fully fledged OLG model of Social Security calibrated with US data. Forteza (2007) 
follows a similar approach to study the redistributive impact of a social security reform in 
Uruguay. In a similar vein, albeit not to study redistribution, Jiménez and Sánchez (2007) 
estimate a structural life cycle model to assess the incentives to retire in the Spanish Social 
                                                            
5 This is the equivalent to what Lambert (1993, p 266) suggests for the assessment of the impact of income 
taxes: “…the impact of an income tax can now be judged by comparing the “with-tax” income distribution 
with the distribution that would pertain in the tax’s absence –the “no-tax” distribution rather than the “pre-
tax” distribution.” It is interesting to notice though, that ten of the eleven chapters of his classical book on 
distribution and redistribution of income are based on the assumption of invariant pre-tax income 
distribution. 6 
 
Security System. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) represents a key antecedent in this line of 
inquiry. One possible drawback of these models is the assumption of full rationality, 
something that has been subject to much controversy, especially regarding long run 
decisions like those involved in social security. After all, the most appealed rationale for 
pension programs is individuals' myopia (Diamond, 2005, chap. 4). In principle, a model 
with hyperbolic preferences could do the job, but solving and calibrating these models is 
even more difficult than the already demanding standard optimization, full rationality 
models. 
In turn, much of fiscal incidence analysis is done on the non-behavioral type of 
assumption. It is usually performed under the assumption that pre-tax income is not 
affected by the tax system. Because of this, it is often interpreted as an analysis of the 
impact effect of the fiscal system (Lambert, 1993, pp 153, 162, chap 11). One such 
example is Euromod. Sutherland (2001) warns: “EUROMOD is better-suited to analysing 
some types of policy and policy change than others. Since it is a static model, designed to 
calculate the immediate, “morning after” effect of policy changes, it neither incorporates 
the effects of behavioural changes (i.e. behaviour does not change) nor the long-term effect 
of change. Thus it is not the appropriate tool for examining policy that is only designed to 
change behaviour, nor for policy that can only have its impact in the long term (e.g. some 
forms of pensions policy). It is best-suited to the analysis of policies that have an 
immediate effect and which depend only on current income and circumstance.” For our 
analysis, we will be using life cycle models that are better suited to assess the redistributive 
impact of social security policies than the typical static short run models used in most 
microsimulations. However, following standard practice in microsimulations, we will not 
model behavioral responses. Our approach is closer to the literature pioneered by Gruber 
and Wise (1999, 2004), who designed and computed a series of indicators of social 
security incentives to retire assuming no explicit behavioral responses. Our study is also 
close to Liebman (2001) and Brown et al. (2009) who simulate lifetime income and 
compute redistribution in US Social Security using non-behavioral models. 
In our view, these two approaches are largely complementary. The optimization models 
have the obvious advantage of incorporating behavioral responses, so not only the direct 
effects of policies are considered, but also the indirect effects that go through behavioral 
changes. However, in order to keep things manageable, these theoretically ambitious 7 
 
models need to make highly stylized assumptions regarding not only individual 
preferences and constraints, but also social security programs. Given our goals, this is a 
serious drawback. We want to assess the lifetime implicit transfers in social security given 
the observed histories of contribution in Latin American countries. We are only beginning 
to characterize the very heterogeneous highly fragmented histories of contribution present 
in the region (Forteza et al. 2009) and quite far from having optimization models that can 
fit these patterns. Whether these histories of contribution are optimal responses to social 
security rules and various shocks is something we cannot answer yet. But given social 
security rules, it is pretty clear that these patterns of contribution seriously condition 
effective net transfers to social security. Non-behavioral micro-simulations are based on 
exogenously given work histories and geared to providing insights on the social security 
transfers that emerge from those histories. Thanks to their relative simplicity, non-
behavioral models allow for a much more detailed specification of the policy rules and 
work histories than intertemporal optimization models. An additional advantage of micro-
simulations is that the effects are straightforward, so no black-box issues arise. At the very 
least, we can expect to capture the first-order impact effects of social security on income 
distribution. The micro-simulation modeling can thus be seen as a first step in a more 
ambitious research program that incorporates behavioral responses at a more advanced 
phase.
6 
4  Data 
We use two sources of data: administrative records from Social Security (Uruguay and 
Chile) and surveys (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). In what follows, we provide brief 
descriptions of the databases. 
4.1  Argentinean data 
We used a household survey (the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares or EPH) for the period 
1995-2003.
 7 The EPH is carried out twice a year (May and October) covering only urban 
                                                            
6 An example of this strategy is the retirement research line followed by Jiménez and collaborators in the case 
of Spain (Boldrin et al. 1999, 2004; Jiménez and Sánchez, 2007).  
7 From the second half of 2003 the EPH suffered from an important methodological change that impede us to 
extend the period of analysis, also because of the timing households are surveyed under the new EPH this is 
less suitable for the purposes of the present study. 8 
 
areas (around 61% of the country total population, and 70% of the country urban 
population). Each household included in the EPH, and all the individuals within it, is 
surveyed four consecutive times, with a replacement rate of 25% of the sample each 
survey. The EPH provides detailed information on the labor status, personal characteristics 
(age, gender, education, etc.) on each individual, as well as on characteristics of the 
household (number of members, living conditions, etc.).  
4.2  Brazilian data 
The Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), or Monthly Employment Survey, is a monthly 
rotating panel of dwellers in six major metropolitan areas in Brazil (São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Porto Alegre and Recife), compiled by IBGE. These six 
metropolitan areas cover approximately 25% of the country's population. The PME survey 
was redesigned in March, 2002. Currently, microdata is available since then until August, 
2010. 
The survey investigates schooling, labor force, demographic, and earnings characteristics 
of each resident aged 10 or more that lives on the interviewed households. This results in 
approximately 100,000 individuals from 35,000 households every month. One important 
feature is that there is no information on earnings not arising from labor. 
The rotating scheme is as follows. Households are interviewed once per month during four 
consecutive months after which they stay out of the survey for an eight-month window. 
After this period, the household is interviewed again in four consecutive months. Once this 
last spell is finished, the household is permanently excluded from the sample. Households 
are divided into 4 rotating groups, in order to make sure that in two consecutive months 
75% of the sample is the same. 
The PME does not identify individuals directly, only their households. Thus, a matching 
process needs to take place. We match individuals within households over time using date 
of birth and gender, but a caveat of doing this is that there might be some attrition. In fact, 
according to Ribas and Soares (2010), on average 4% of the households sampled in the 
PME do not answer to the survey in the following month. In order to avoid (or at least 
minimize) a selection bias, the authors propose an algorithm and the inclusion of an 
‘answering probability estimator’ in an estimation à la Heckman. 9 
 
In order to build the database, we match individuals (using the algorithm proposed above) 
that were surveyed for two consecutive months and consider this matching as one 
observation. Characteristics such as income, gender, age, marital status and schooling are 
taken from the first interview (identified by t), together with labor status. The subsequent 
interview (identified by t+1) gives only the new labor status and income. 
 
4.3  Chilean data 
We have access to the Base de Historias Previsionales de Afiliados Activos, Pensionados y 
Fallecidos  (Affiliates Pension Histories database, HPA), populated with individual 
contribution records from 1981 to 2009, for a sample of participants in the pension 
system.
8 The HPA includes the complete contribution history (in the pension system) for a 
sample of approximately 24,000 individuals, representative of the stock of affiliates of the 
system in July 2002.
9 In addition, the dataset also includes information on the recognition 
bonds held by the sampled individuals. 
4.4  Mexican data 
The data source is a household survey carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía de Mexico, more specifically we use the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE). 
The  ENE is a continuous quarterly national survey representative of the whole population. 
The unit of analysis of the ENE is the household, but with a specific questionnaire for each 
individual living in it, which allows to control for personal characteristics. The replacement 
rate in the sample is 20% so each unit is surveyed during five consecutive quarters after 
which they are dropped from the survey. The period we work with runs form the third 
quarter of 2000 until the last quarter of 2004.
10 
                                                            
8 The sample was originally drawn as the basis for the Social Protection Survey, a panel instrument that was 
taken in 2002, 2004 and 2006 for a large fraction of the individuals in the sample. The Social Protection 
Survey was inspired by the American Health and Retirement Survey. For more information on the Chilean 
version, see www.proteccionsocial.cl. 
9 Upon initial contribution, the individual is considered an “affiliate”. 
10 A new nationwide survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo y Ocupación (ENOE) started in the first 
quarter of 2005. However, because of the information we require to carry out the analysis we work with the 
ENE.  10 
 
4.5  Uruguayan data 
We used a random sample of the work history records of the main social security 
institution of Uruguay (BPS), collected in December 2004 by the Labor History Unit of the 
BPS (ATYR-BPS). Workers in the sample contributed at least one month between April 
1996 and December 2004. The sample has close to 70,000 individuals.  
The records are organized in five databases. One file gives personal information on 
individuals: date of birth, sex and country of birth. Another file reports about the job of 
each person, particularly the date of initiation of activity and the explicit end of the link 
between the worker and the firm. A third file reports monthly information about the 
contributions. In particular, we have information on wages and some characteristics of the 
job. A separate database contains information about benefits, including the date of 
retirement.  
This database provides detailed information about monthly contributions to social security, 
gender, age, and sector of activity. Unfortunately, we do not have yet for Uruguay a survey 
of socio-economic characteristics of contributors to social security. Hence, we lack some 
important socio-economic characteristics like education and characteristics of the families.  
5  Methods 
The methodology is comprised of four steps. (i) Estimation and simulation of labor status 
and labor income models. (ii) Computation of social security contributions and pensions. 
(iii) Computation of pre- and post-social security lifetime income. (iv) Computation of 
income distribution measures. 
 
5.1  Labor income and labor status models 
We separately estimate models for labor income and working-contributing status. We 
model labor income to simulate strings of lifetime labor income, conditional on being 
working/contributing. We also model labor status, i.e. whether the individual is 
contributing or not, and simulate lifetime contributing status. Multiplying the simulated 
labor income and the contributing status, we generate the series of work histories on which 
we base our estimations of labor income distribution and social security redistribution.
11  
                                                            
11 Some of the methods used in this project are based on Forteza et al. (2009).  11 
 
Notice that we are simulating the labor income that is declared to social security (according 
to administrative records or the surveys, depending on the country case). This is the 
relevant series for the computation of social security benefits, but it may be very different 
from total labor income in Latin American countries.  
In the case of administrative data (Chile and Uruguay), we have a relatively large number 
of observations for each individual, but relatively poor socioeconomic information to 
characterize individuals.
12  We take advantage of the relatively long panel to estimate 
unobserved individual effects that capture much of the variance in the population. In the 
case of the survey data (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) we have shorter panels, but better 
socioeconomic characterizations. We could then explicitly model heterogeneity using 
education and related variables. The details depend much on data specificities that vary 
from country to country. Because of this, we only provide general guidelines in this 
document. 
5.1.1  Projection of labor income 
We estimate two wage equations. Wages in the second and following months of a spell of 
contribution are modeled using a dynamic equation. Wages in the first month of a 
contribution spell are modeled with a static equation. Given that our main goal is to project 
income, we are particularly interested in exploring the impact on wages of time invariant 
and deterministic covariates, like age and time trends.  
Wages in the second and following months of the spell of contribution are assumed to be 
governed by the following stochastic process, 
it i t it it it it it it e v x a a dur w w + + + + + + + = − δ β β β β β ρ 5 4
2
3 2 1 1 ln ln ln  
 (1) 
                                                            
12 In the Chilean case, it would be possible to complement administrative records with information from the 
social protection survey (Encuesta de Protección Social) that provides valuable socio-economic information. 
However, to avoid problems stemming from imperfect matching of individuals in the two sources, we 
preferred not to use the social protection survey in this study. 12 
 
Where  it w is the real wage
13;  it dur is the tenure in the current job;   it a   is the age;  it x
accounts for other control variables (like education);  t δ  are month dummies; and  i ν is a 
time invariant unobservable characteristic of individual i. The idiosyncratic shock  it e is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
2
it σ .  
In the case of administrative data (Chile and Uruguay), we do not observe the education 
level of the individuals. Therefore, the term  i ν will capture, at least in part, the cross 
section heterogeneity that comes from education jointly with other time invariant 
unobservable characteristics like ability. In the case of survey data, education indicators 
were included.  
In Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay, this equation was estimated for male and female and 
public and private employees separately. In Brazil, two equations were estimated, one for 
men and the other for women, and only for private sector workers. In the case of Chile, 
only one equation was estimated using a gender dummy interacted with age and age 
squared.  
We computed the individual effects as: 
() () t it it it it it it
T
t i




δ β β β β β ρ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ˆ ln
1 ˆ 5 4
2
3 2 1 1
1
+ + + + + − = −
= ∑  
(2) 
Once the econometric models were estimated, predicted values of labor income were 
calculated as follows: 
i t is is is is is is v x a a r u ld w w ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~ ˆ ~ ln ˆ ~ ln 5 4
2
3 2 1 1 + + + + + + = − δ β β β β β ρ  
(3) 
Because of the number of periods observed, the estimates of the individual effects are less 
precise in the case of surveys than administrative data, but we are more interested in the 
distribution of these variables than on the individual values, so this should not be a serious 
                                                            
13  In the case of Uruguay, following Bosworth et al. (1999), we use the ratio of the nominal wage of 
individual i at period t respect to the nominal wage index of the economy at period t. 13 
 
issue. What is really crucial for our purposes is to get a good characterization of the 
distribution of the observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  
The second equation is applied to the initial month of the contribution spells. The equation 
to estimate is as follows:  
 
(4) 
Where  i b is the average real wage,  i a is the age and  i ν ˆ  is the individual effect estimated 
with equation (1). Since this is a cross-section estimation we do not include a time 
subindex. We use the OLS estimator with the White formula in order to obtain the standard 
errors.  
We use equation (4) to predict the covered wage of the first month of a new spell of 
contribution provided the individual has previously stayed in a spell of non-contribution at 
least three months. Thus the prediction is given by: 
i i i i v a a b ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~
ln 4
2
3 2 1 α α α α + + + =
 
(5) 
5.1.2  Projection of the contribution status 
Two types of models were used to project the contribution status. In the case of Chile, we 
modeled the duration of the spells of contribution and not contribution. In the other four 
countries we used linear probability models.  
5.1.2.1  The linear probability models 
A simple approach to estimating the probability of making contributions that directly 
exploits, for prediction purposes, the longitudinal nature of the data is to fit a fixed effect 
linear probability model. The main advantage of this type of models is that they allow 
using estimated individual fixed effects to make predictions for the entire lifetime. This is 
particularly relevant if the data does not allow including sufficiently rich control variables. 
A drawback of the linear probability model is that it does not rule out probabilities out of 
the 0-1 interval. 
In the linear probability model, the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual 
makes a contribution during a particular month and zero otherwise  {} ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ it C . We used 




two variants of the linear probability model: (A) a model with two equations, one for each 
contribution status in the previous month, and (B) a model with one equation and a dummy 
variable to capture the contribution status in the previous month. The models are as 
follows: 
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In turn, the individual effects in the contribution status equations can be computed as: 
() ( )
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Where  () otherwise s C if s C it it 0 ; 1 1 1 = = = Ι − − .  
A drawback of this specification is that we may lose many observations. Only when we 
observe two or more times the individual in state s can we compute the corresponding 
individual effect( )
s
i η . In the case of databases with few periods per individual, there will be 
many individuals for which we cannot compute the individual effects for both states. 
Because of this issue, in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico we used the following 
model. 
B) One equation for both contribution status 
()
otherwise C if D
D x D x C
it it
it i it it it it it
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(7) 
The individual effect can be computed as: 
() ( ) ( ) ∑ = − + − − =
i T
t i it it it it it i T D x D x C
2
1 0 1 ˆ ' ˆ 1 ' ~ β β η
 
Either with model A or B, we need an additional equation to project the contribution status 
in the first period of the simulated individuals. We assumed that individuals start 
contributing at 18 and estimate a static contribution-status equation at that age: 15 
 
it i it it e x C + + = 2 1 ' ˆ ' α η α  
(8) 
Where we are using the individual effects computed in the dynamic equations as an 
additional regressor.  
The set of variables to be included as regressors depends on data availability (which varies 
from country to country), but in all cases the same variables used to capture the observed 
individual heterogeneity and the estimated individual effects ( ) i ν ~   in the labor income 
equations were included. These variables are essential to link labor income and 
contribution status in the simulations.  
We simulate the contribution status of workers across their lifetime conditional on the 
individual not retiring or dying. Simulations start at the age of 18 with equation (8), and 
continue with equation (7). More specifically, we simulate the probability of contributing 
                  1    , draw realizations from a uniform (0,1) distribution          and set 
    as:        1                               0          . 
We compute the percentage of correct predictions in the sample to assess the goodness of 
fit of the models.  
5.1.2.2  Modeling duration 
Taking advantage of the Chilean long panel (1981 to December 2009), Fajnzylber (2011) 
used the observed histories of contribution of a series of cohorts born between 1963 and 
1967 and only complemented the observed with simulated histories for the years following 
2009. To do that, he modeled the length of the spells (both contribution and non-
contribution spells) as follows: 
ln Length      α   β  ·A g e      β  ·A g e   
    β  ·  Age   ·F e m a l e      β 
·  A g e   
  ·F e m a l e    β  ·t η    ε   
 
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes the spells of each individual and the variable Age is 
measured at the beginning of the corresponding spell. The variable η  represents  the 
individual fixed effects. 16 
 
  
5.2  Computation of SS contributions and benefits 
Once we had the simulated work histories, we computed social security contributions, 
unemployment benefits and pensions, according to the existing social security norms. This 
step involves programming the current social security rules. We considered both employee 
and employer contributions, as both eventually impact on net wages in the long run 
(Gruber, 1999, p 90; Brown et al. 2009, p 13; Hamermesh and Rees 1993, p 212).  
We considered two social security programs, old-age pensions and unemployment 
insurance. Old-age, survival and disability (OASDI) benefits are usually integrated in a 
single program. Unemployment insurance is often an independent program, but with 
important contributions from the government. In the case of Uruguay, contributions to 
social security finance both OASDI and unemployment insurance. Because of this, Forteza 
and Mussio (2011) modeled the two programs together. Regarding OASDI benefits, we 
focused on old-age pensions, assuming the simulated individuals leave no survivors and 
suffer no disability.  
Individuals are assumed to claim benefits as soon as they are eligible. In the cases of 
Argentina and Uruguay, a scenario in which vesting period conditions are not fully 
enforced was also simulated. In this alternative scenario, individuals who claim and receive 
pensions without having fulfilled the years of contribution legally required are assumed to 
receive minimum pensions. The aim of simulating this weak enforcement scenario is 
twofold. First, we want to assess the impact of vesting period conditions on social security 
progressiveness. Second, this scenario is a stylized representation of actual practices in two 
social security programs in which the testimony of witnesses to credit contributions is still 
common practice.  
5.3  Computation of pre- and post-social-security lifetime income 
The expected pre-social security lifetime labor income is the present value of the expected 
simulated labor income: 













Where r is age at retirement,  () a p  is the probability of worker’s survival at age a,  ( ) a W  
is labor income at age a, andρ is the discount rate. 
We computed the lifetime social security wealth as an indicator of social security transfers. 
Social security wealth is the present value of expected net transfers to social security. It can 
be obtained as the sum of the discounted expected flow of old-age pensions() PB  and 
unemployment benefits () UB , net of contributions ( ) SSC .  
SSC UB PB SSW − + =  








+ = ∑ ρ 1 ,
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Where  age max  is maximum potential age,  ( ) r a B ,  is the amount of retirement benefits at 
age aconditional on retirement at age r,  ( ) a UB  is the unemployment benefit collected at 
age a, and () a C  is the amount of contribution to social security at age a.
 14 
The formulas used in this study to compute social security wealth are adapted from the 
literature that studies incentives to retire (e.g. Blanchet and Pelé, 1999, p132). Similar 
expressions are used in the literature that analyzes lifetime redistribution in social security 
(e.g. Liebman, 2001). 
Results are sensitive to the discount rate. Higher discount rates reduce social security 
wealth because benefits are mostly paid after contributions (particularly so in pensions). 
The progressivity of social security transfers measured through lifetime transfers is likely 
to be smaller the higher the discount rate, partly because of the social security wealth 
reduction it involves, but also because most social security programs perform redistribution 
                                                            
14 In the Chilean case, pension benefits include the possibility of paying off the balance in the account of a 
worker who dies before retirement to her survivors, as a survivorship pension or inheritance. 18 
 
through benefit rather than contribution formulas (Brown et al. 2009 make this point for 
the US public social security program). We used a discount rate of 3 percent per annum 
(ppa), but Forteza and Mussio (2011) and Moncarz (2011) performed sensitivity analysis 
for Uruguay and Argentina respectively. For the US case, Brown et al. (2009) use 2 and 4 
ppa. Liebman (2001) uses the internal rate of return of the cohort he analyzes -1.29 ppa- in 
order to focus only on intra-cohort redistribution.  
Following our assumption of no behavioral responses, we assume that social security does 
not impact on the age at retirement, so we used the same value of r  to compute the pre- 
and post-social security labor income. The only departure from this assumption is in the 
weak enforcement scenario, in which all individuals retired at the minimum retirement age. 
Also, we assumed that the interruptions in labor history are exogenously given, 
independent of the unemployment insurance program.    
5.4  Computation of income distribution indexes 
We first characterize the distribution of individuals (i) social security wealth and (ii) social 
security wealth to income ratios. These indicators provide a first assessment of how much 
redistribution is taking place within the social security system.  
Second, we plot individual social security wealth versus pre-social security labor income. 
This is a first indicator of local progressiveness in social security redistribution. Liebman 
(2001) presents similar plots for the US. 
Third, we compute the Lorenz curves of the expected pre-social security labor income and 
the associated concentration curves of the expected post-social security labor income 
(ranked by pre-social security income).  
Fourth, we compute the Ginis of the pre- and post-social security labor income and 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Finally, we compute the Reynolds-Smolensky-type index of net redistributive effect 
(Lambert, 1993, p 256). This index assesses the redistributive impact of a program 
computing the area between the Lorenz pre-program income and the concentration post-
program income. A positive (negative) value indicates that the program reduces (increases) 
inequality.  19 
 
The Lorenz and concentration curves, the Gini coefficients and the Reynolds-Somelinsky 
index were estimated using DASP (Araar and Duclos 2009). 
6  Results 
Estimations of the econometric models used to project labor income and contributions are 
not presented in this paper. Readers interested in these intermediate results should look at 
the background articles. The focus in this document is on the redistributive impact of the 
programs. To that we turn now. 
We present in Table 2 some descriptive statistics of the simulated databases. Average 
expected life time income ranges from 64 thousand dollars in the Mexican to 199 thousand 
dollars in the Argentinean databases. In the five countries, the simulated databases exhibit 
much dispersion of income, which is crucial to effectively assess redistribution. There are 
some simulated individuals with very low income. The percentile one individual (P1) has 
almost no life time income in Brazil, partly due to small income when working but mostly 
due to very short histories of contribution. The other countries exhibit higher P1 incomes, 
but even in Argentina, which exhibits the highest P1 income, it is smaller than 4 thousand 
dollars. At the other end of the distribution, the percentile 99 individuals (P99) range from 
260 thousand dollars in Mexico to more than 1,500 thousand dollars in Brazil. As 
expected, the distributions are skewed to the right, with median consistently lower than 
mean income. 
Average social security wealth ranges from minus 27 thousand dollars in Argentina to 4.5 
thousand dollars in Chile. Measured by the difference between percentiles 1 and 99 within 
each country, social security wealth exhibits more dispersion in Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay than in Chile and Mexico. This is an expected result, since the Chilean and 
Mexican pensions programs are based on individual accounts, while the Argentinean and 
Brazilian programs are PAYG-DB and the Uruguayan program is mixed, but with a large 
proportion of PAYG-DB. The Mexican social security system appears as almost actuarially 
neutral in these simulations. The Chilean system looks much less neutral: the P1 and P99 
social security wealth are minus 3.3 and plus 9.4 thousand dollars, respectively.  
Brazil is the country that exhibits the largest dispersion in social security wealth in our 
study. The P1 is as low as minus 258 thousand dollars. This large losses result from the 
lack of ceilings on employers’ contributions combined with a maximum pension. 20 
 
Therefore, there is no lower bound on social security wealth, since the higher the wage, the 
higher the implicit tax (and the implicit redistribution). Argentina and Uruguay show much 
higher P1. Unlike in Brazil, because of the existence of ceilings on insured wages, total 
contributions cannot be higher than certain thresholds and social security wealth has a 
lower bound. 
The distribution of social security wealth looks skewed to the left in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay and to the right in the Mexican system.  
We also computed the expected social security wealth to life time income ratio for each 
simulated individual. This indicator exhibits much dispersion between and within 
countries. The average ratio ranges from – 17 percent in Argentina to + 28 percent in 
Chile. It is zero in Mexico, 6 percent in Brazil and 8 percent in Uruguay.
15  
The social security wealth to income ratio exhibits almost no dispersion in the simulated 
Mexican database. Therefore, according to these results, social security would not perform 
any significant redistribution in expected terms in Mexico. This is not surprising in an 
individual accounts program. Nevertheless, the other individual accounts program in our 
sample, Chile, exhibits much more dispersion. Sorting individuals by the social security 
wealth to lifetime income ratio, the P1 individual loses about 1 percent and the P99 
individual gains 331 percent of their lifetime income in Chile. So, despite of being based 
on individual accounts, the Chilean system seems to have enough departure from actuarial 
neutrality as to perform significant redistribution. The Argentinean program shows less 
dispersion in the ratio than other programs covered in our study, apart from Mexico. 
However, the fact that the P1 individual losses is as much as 24 percent of his lifetime 
income through social security indicates that we cannot yet rule out significant 
redistribution from taking place within the Argentinean social security system. The 
Brazilian and Uruguayan programs show much more variation in the ratio, highlighting a 
potentially large redistribution. 
According to our simulations, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay exhibit considerable 
variation in social security wealth and social security wealth to lifetime income ratios 
                                                            
15 Liebman (2001) computed the same indicator for the United States. Using a discount rate of 3 percent per 
annum -the same rate used in the present study-, he finds the average ratio to be -6.6%.  21 
 
across individuals, performing significant redistribution. This is not the case of Mexico. 
Whether this potential is actually realized and what sign it has depends on how these 
transfers are correlated to lifetime income. We turn now to this point. 
Figure 1 plots social security wealth and pre social security lifetime labor income. To 
facilitate comparisons, we limited the range of values in the figure from the minimum P1 
to the maximum P99 in the set of countries. It should be noticed that in the case of Brazil 
individuals with income above P99 would have social security wealth smaller than the 
highly negative value observed in the figure. Instead, in the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay, higher income workers do not get more negative social security wealth, because 
as explained before they have already reached the lower bound. 
The negative slope of the plots suggests that the PAYG Argentinean and Brazilian 
programs and the mixed Uruguayan program are progressive, while the flat plots of the 
individual accounts Chilean and Mexican programs suggest much more neutrality. 
Actually, there is redistribution at the lower end of the distribution in the Chilean and 
Mexican programs, but when the scale of the graphs is unified to facilitate cross-country 
comparisons as we did in this figure, the plots of the individual accounts programs look flat 
compared to the plots of the PAYG and mixed programs.  
Figure 1 also shows considerable variability of social security wealth for each level of 
lifetime labor income in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Therefore, there seems to be some 
redistribution that is not correlated to income levels in the PAYG and mixed programs 
covered in this study. Liebman (2001) reports a similar finding for the US.  
These observations suggest that while the individual account programs perform less 
redistribution on average than the PAYG programs, they might be better targeted regarding 
redistribution. The net impact of the programs on the distribution of post-social security 
life time income is thus not a priori obvious. 
Figure 2 presents the Lorenz curves of pre social security labor income and the 
concentration curves of post social security labor income. We do not observe large 
differences between the pre and post social security curves in these countries. Brazil and 
Chile are the only cases in which there seems to be an observable equalizing effect of 
social security. 22 
 
The Gini coefficients of the simulated pre social security life time labor income range from 
a minimum of 0.48 in Mexico to a maximum of 0.76 in Brazil (Table 3). According to this 
indicator, the distribution of the income measure considered in the present study is much 
more unequal than the distribution of current household per capita income reported to 
household surveys in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and more equal in Chile and 
Mexico.
16  Brazil is the most unequal in this group of countries according to both 
estimations, but the ranking regarding other countries differs considerably. We do not want 
to push the comparative perspective further, though, not only because the definition of 
income used in these studies is very different, but also because data sources used to 
compute life time income in the five countries covered in our project are also different 
(short panel surveys in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and administrative records in Chile 
and Uruguay). More research on the distribution of life time labor income declared to 
social security is needed. With this caveat in mind, we turn now to our estimations of the 
impact of social security on inequality. 
According to our estimations, Chile is the country in which social security causes the 
largest reduction in inequality (Table 3 and Table 4). The point estimation of the Gini 
coefficient is reduced by almost four points and the 95% confidence intervals do not 
overlap. The Reynolds-Smolenski index (RS) of effective progression is almost 4 
percentage points and is significant at 1%.The second largest fall in the Gini coefficient 
due to social security in our study takes place in Brazil, where we see a two point fall, and 
the third in Uruguay, with a 1.8 point fall. The RS index is in the order of 2 percentage 
points and highly significant both in Brazil and Uruguay. Mexico shows almost no change 
in the Gini coefficients. The RS index is 0.02 percentage points. Finally, Argentina shows 
a 1.3 point increase in the Gini coefficient due to social security, with a small overlap of 
the 95% confidence intervals. The RS index is -1.3 percentage points and is significant at 
1%. 
                                                            
16 CEDLAS and The World Bank (April 2011), for example, report Gini coefficients estimated on 2009 
household per capita income of: 0.449 for Argentina, 0.537 for Brazil, 0.519 for Chile, 0.505 for Mexico and 
0.44 for Uruguay. These indicators are not directly comparable to ours though. The Ginis reported in the 
present study refer to individual income as opposed to household per capita income, to labor as opposed to 
total income, to formal (in the sense of reported to social security) as opposed to formal plus informal 
income, and to simulated expected lifetime as opposed to reported current income. Also, in the case of Brazil, 
only private sector workers are included. 23 
 
The reduction in income inequality that the Chilean social security system performs is 
remarkable. It is a system based on mostly actuarially neutral individual savings accounts, 
and as such produces much less redistribution than the PAYG and mixed programs 
analyzed in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The difference between the P99 and P1 social 
security wealth is more than 90 thousand dollars in Argentina and Uruguay, and more than 
260 thousand dollars in Brazil, but only 13 thousand dollars in Chile. And yet, the Chilean 
program is the one that shows the largest fall in income inequality in the countries studied. 
This result suggests that redistribution in the Chilean pension program is much better 
targeted than in the other four countries. The limited but well targeted redistribution in this 
social security system rests on the combination of a mostly actuarially neutral savings 
account and a relatively small but well targeted solidarity complement. 
In addition, it is not surprising that the Mexican social security system does not impact on 
income distribution.  Descriptive statistics of the social security wealth showed very small 
values, consistent with a mostly actuarially neutral program. Minimum pensions and 
government matching contributions represent departures from actuarial neutrality in the 
Mexican social security system, but the size of these deviations is not enough to 
significantly impact on income distribution.  
The failure of the Argentinean and, to a lesser extent, the Uruguayan social security 
programs to reduce inequality represents a puzzle. Vesting period conditions might help 
explain the puzzle. In Argentina and Uruguay ordinary pensions can be claimed after thirty 
years of contribution, a condition that many contributors do not seem to be able to fulfill. 
Forteza et al. (2009) show that large segments of the population have a low probability of 
having contributed thirty or more years when they reach retirement ages, and this 
probability is particularly low among low income individuals. In turn, Forteza and Ourens 
(2011) show that the implicit rate of return on contributions paid to these programs is very 
low when individuals have short contribution histories. Hence, low income individuals 
might be getting a bad deal from social security because they have short histories of 
contribution.  
In order to test this hypothesis, Moncarz (2011) and Forteza and Mussio (2011) simulated 
an additional scenario in which the vesting period condition is not required in practice. In 
this “weak enforcement” scenario, the social security administration does not control 
whether individuals have contributed the required thirty years to get an ordinary pension at 24 
 
the minimum retirement age. The assumption is that everybody can claim an ordinary 
pension at that age. Individuals who did not contribute thirty or more years at that age 
receive the minimum pension. This scenario is not only useful to see whether vesting 
period conditions could be behind the redistributive puzzle, but also to get closer to actual 
practice in weak institutional environments in which the testimony of witnesses to credit 
periods of contribution to social security is still common practice. The results of this 
scenario are summarized in Table 6, Table 7 and Figure 3. 
Social security looks more progressive in the weak than in the strict enforcement scenario. 
In Uruguay, social security causes a 2.6 points fall in the Gini coefficient in the weak 
against 1.7 in the strict enforcement scenario. The RS is now 2.6 percentage points. An 
increase in the social security wealth of low income individuals seems to be behind the 
improvement (Figure 3). In Argentina, social security still fails to reduce inequality in the 
weak enforcement scenario. The Gini coefficient does not increase as much as in the base 
case scenario, but post-social security income still exhibits higher Gini than pre-social 
security income and the RS index is negative and significant at the usual levels.     
Moncarz (2011) for Argentina and Forteza and Mussio (2011) for Uruguay run additional 
simulations with lower discount rates. Social security looks more redistributive when flows 
are discounted at lower interest rates, but the main results do not change qualitatively. In 
the case of Argentina, only in the scenario with weak enforcement and 1 percent interest 
rate (the lowest rate used) did social security significantly reduce inequality.  
Fajnzylber (2011) assesses the separate impact of unemployment insurance and old age 
pension programs on the distribution of income in Chile.  He finds that unemployment 
insurance is progressive. Most individuals have negative expected life time net transfers to 
this program, but individuals at the bottom of income distribution have positive net 
transfers due to the solidarity fund. Higher income individuals are less likely to benefit 
from this fund because (i) they are less exposed to unemployment and (ii) when 
unemployed they are less likely to be eligible for the solidarity funds benefits, because the 
balances in their individual accounts tend to exceed the maximum level to be eligible for 
these benefits. 
Notwithstanding, the unemployment insurance program has a limited impact on income 
distribution. Fajnzylber (2011) reports a Reynolds-Smolenski index of redistributive effect 25 
 
of 0.097 for this program, as opposed to 3.876 for the joint effect of unemployment 
insurance and old-age pensions. The main reason behind this is the relatively small size of 
the unemployment insurance program. 
7  Concluding Remarks 
The studies summarized in this document show that much redistribution is taking place 
through the social security systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, very little in Mexico 
and something in between in Chile. Life time redistribution was measured simulating 
histories of contribution and computing benefits and individual expected life time net 
transfers to social security (i.e. the individuals’ social security wealth). The amount of 
redistribution was assessed computing the dispersion of the social security wealth and the 
social security wealth to pre social security income ratios. The difference between the 
percentiles 99 and 1 of social security wealth is about 260 thousand dollars in Brazil, 90 to 
100 thousand dollars in Argentina and Uruguay, 13 thousand in Chile and 0.5 thousand 
dollars in Mexico. As expected, the two individual accounts programs (Chile and Mexico) 
exhibit much less redistribution than the PAYG and mixed programs (Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay). 
However, the net impact of social security on the distribution of income is not directly 
aligned to the size of total redistribution. Chile is the country in which the social security 
system makes the largest contribution to reducing inequality, despite of having the second 
smallest dispersion in social security wealth in our sample of countries. Fajnzylber (2011) 
reports an almost four points reduction in the Gini coefficient in Chile, as compared to 
about two points reduction in Brazil (Zylberstajn, 2011) and Uruguay (Forteza and Mussio, 
2011), no changes in Mexico, and 1.3 points increase in Argentina (Moncarz, 2011). 
The results summarized in this document suggest that the Chilean program has less but 
better targeted redistribution than the Argentinean, Brazilian and Uruguayan programs: 
with less total redistribution it performs a larger reduction in inequality. The Brazilian and 
Uruguayan programs look quite progressive, but not as much as the Chilean one and much 
of the redistribution they cause does not seem to be contributing to reducing inequality. 
The Mexican program does not seem to redistribute much. The Argentinean program is the 
most puzzling: it performs much redistribution, but it fails to reduce inequality, and it 
might even exacerbate it.  26 
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Tables 
Table 1: Main parameters in the old-age pension programs 
Program  Contributions   a/  Qualifying conditions  Benefits 
Argentina 
( PAYG-DB ) 
Employee: 11.00% 
Employer: 16.00% 
Men:       65 &       30  
Women:       60  &        30 
      "          " 
Minimum pension = 265 dollars (end of 2010) 
Where: 
      125                 2010  
"          "   0.015       35,          
      7 0&3 0       1 0  
(with at leat 5 years of contributions 
during the 8 years previous to retire) 
0.7         "          " 
Brazil 
( PAYG-DB )  
Employee: 8 to 11%. 
Employer: 20%. 
a) "Length of service":  
Men:        35  
Women:        30 
      "                     " 
Note: the “fator previdenciario” is a decreasing 
function of life expectancy at retirement. 
b) "Advanced age":  
Men:       65  &        15 
Women:       60 &       15 
 0 . 7  1   0.01             
 30 
 
Program  Contributions   a/  Qualifying conditions  Benefits 
Chile 
 (Individual accounts 
plus “solidarity” pillar) 
Employee: 13.04% 
(10% individual account + 1.49% 
disability and insurance premium + 
1.55% average administrative fee, 
as of April 2011) 
(Employers with more than 100 
workers pay the 1.49% D&I 
premium) 
   :       65  
              60    
          0.7       &         
          1.5      .   . 
 
Annuity + "solidarity complement" 
 
Note: “solidarity complement” is reduced with the 
level of the annuity and becomes zero if  
              , where PMAS is the Maximum 
Pension with Solidarity Complement 
Mexico 
(Individual accounts 
plus minimum pension 




Government: 0.225% + flat 
contribution for each day of 
contribution (decreasing in 
the wage rate) 
      65 &       25     
          1.3       
 
 
                 
Uruguay 
(Mixed program:  
(i) first tier: PAYG-DB; 




      60 &       30           
With:   0.45        0.825 
      70 &       15           
With:   0.5        0.65 
      65    
      60 &       30 
Annuity 
Notes:  age = age when pension is claimed, in years; los = length of service when pension is claimed, in years;       average wage (wages 
included in this average vary considerably between programs) ;          minimum pension. 
a/ In most programs, contributions to old age, survivor and disability insurance (OASDI) cannot be separated into three distinct 
components. We report OASDI contributions in all cases. In Uruguay, contributions to old-age pensions and unemployment 31 
 
Program  Contributions   a/  Qualifying conditions  Benefits 
insurance are bunched together. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Forteza and Ourens (2011) . 
 32 
 
Table 2: Pre- social security lifetime labor income and social security wealth (in thousands of 2010 US dollars) 
   Mean  P1  Median  P99  Skewness
Argentina Income  201.1 4.0 115.4 1289.8  4.8
SSW -26.8 -102.1 -15.9 -1.0  -1.4
SSW/Income 
-17% -24% -17% -6% 
 
0.3 
Brazil Income  143.3 0.0 48.1 1533.5  22.3
SSW -19.8 -258.2 -2.4 4.2  -23.4
SSW/Income 6% -30% -6% 196%  3.2
Chile Income  95.2 2.1 62.9 440.8 1.9
SSW 4.5 -3.3 4.4 9.4  -0.3
SSW/Income 28% -1% 8% 331% 7.8
Mexico Income  63.8 0.6 48.5 259.9  1.7
SSW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6  6.2
SSW/Income 0% 0% 0% 2%  6.7
Uruguay Income  175.1 1.3 89.3 1211.4  20.1
SSW -3.6 -77.3 -0.2 17.1  -2.9
SSW/Income 8% -13% -1% 147%  13.5




Table 3: Gini coefficients of life time labor income before and after social security 
    Gini before SS  Gini after SS  
Argentina Estimate  0.5504  0.5638 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.5426  0.5555 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.5582  0.5722 
Brazil Estimate  0.7630  0.7435 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.7412  0.7214 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.7848  0.7655 
Chile Estimate  0.4991  0.4606 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.4902  0.4521 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.5081  0.4691 
Mexico Estimate  0.4787  0.4786 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.4728  0.4726 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.4847  0.4845 
Uruguay Estimate  0.6004  0.5822 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.5889  0.5701 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.6119  0.5943 







Table 4: Index of redistribution (Reynolds-Smolensky index of effective progression) 
 Index  Standard  Error 
Argentina -0.0132  0.00035 
Brazil 0.0198  0.00028 
Chile 0.0388  0.00079 
México 0.0002  0.00001 
Uruguay 0.0187  0.00045 
Source: Fajnzylber (2011), Forteza and Mussio (2011), Moncarz (2011) and 
Zylberstajn (2011) 
 
Table 5: Pre social security lifetime labor income and social security wealth under weak enforcement of pension 
eligibility conditions (in thousands of 2010 US dollars). a/ 
  Mean  P1  Median  P99 
Argentina Income  200.4 4.1 114.9 1289.8
SSW -25.8 -102.1 -17.8 6.5
SSW/Income -7% -20% -13% 135%
Uruguay Income  173.8 0.8 87.8 1211.4
SSW -3.3 -80.1 0.8 11.1
SSW/Income 34% -9% 1% 505%
a/ In this scenario, we dropped the vesting period conditions to access pensions. See text for the 
details. 
Source: Forteza and Mussio (2011) and Moncarz (2011) 
 
Table 6: Gini coefficients of life time labor income before and after social security under weak enforcement of 
pension eligibility conditions. a/ 
    Gini before SS  Gini after SS  
Argentina Estimate  0.554  0.557 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.546  0.549 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.562  0.565 
Uruguay Estimate  0.606  0.580 
Lower confidence bound (95%)  0.594  0.568 
Upper confidence bound (95%)  0.617  0.592 
a/ In this scenario, we dropped the vesting period conditions to access pensions. See text 
for the details. 






Table 7: Index of redistribution under weak enforcement of pension eligibility conditions (Reynolds-Smolensky 
index of effective progression) a/ 
 Index  Standard  Error 
Argentina -0.0029  .0005 
Uruguay 0.0263  .0006 
a/ In this scenario, we dropped the vesting period conditions to access pensions. See text for the 
details. 









Figure 1: Social security wealth and life time income 
 
 




































































































Figure 2: Pre Social Security life time labor income Lorenz curve and post Social Security life time income 
concentration curve  
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Figure 3: Social security wealth and life time income under weak enforcement of pension eligibility conditions a/ 
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